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In certain, typically materialist, strands of contemporary European thought, it may be said that the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) is acclaimed as a prophet of immanence, one who continues the line of Nietzsche and Spinoza.  For Deleuze, transcendence denies the ‘intensification of life’;​[1]​ transcendence says ‘no’ to life, its movements and intensities.  Such claims would seem to damn any theological vision of life as that which is given and sustained by divine transcendence.  Meister Eckhart’s repeated insistence on the absolute nothingness of creatures,​[2]​ relative to the transcendent creator, would strike immanentists such as Deleuze as offering a particularly vivid example of the nihilistic impulse basic to any positing of transcendence.  However, caution is required before ceding the immanentist conclusion.  The problem is that what might be understood by the term ‘life’ is far from clear.  For life is a paradoxical character: ubiquitous (since it may be biological, political, artificial, spiritual, metaphysical, etc) yet elusive; dynamic yet inseparably bound up with the stasis of death.  

Echoing Heidegger on ‘Being’, Eugene Thacker suggests that ‘the question of “life” is the question that has come to define our contemporary era’, an era where the significance of biopolitics is especially pressing.​[3]​  But, I wonder, is the question of life answered in advance for theology, at least any theology which avows divine transcendence?  With Nietzsche and Deleuze, must we assume that theology is inevitably anti-life?  

In this essay I wish to explore the concept of life as it emerges in the works of Deleuze and Eckhart, two thinkers who, in their accounts of life, emphasize the import of immanence and transcendence respectively.  Admittedly, these two writers have very different projects, addressing specific problems raised by their different historical contexts.  Nevertheless, there are aspects of Eckhart’s medieval thought which resonate in significant ways with Deleuze’s postmodern philosophy.  

Of particular interest to me in this essay is showing how reading these two thinkers alongside each other reveal moments of slippage between the categories of absolute immanence and absolute transcendence.  Reflection on this slippage can draw our attention to a further problem: the relationship between Life and the living.  In his important study After Life, Thacker argues that it is Aristotle’s concept of psukhē in De Anima which (in western philosophy at least) first institutes the ‘bifurcation between Life and the living’.​[4]​  Psukhē, Thacker contends, is an internally contradictory concept forcing Aristotle ‘to think “life” in terms other-than-life’.​[5]​ (This is because Aristotle presents psukhē as the principle-of-life which as such is distinct from life because it is the ground of living things).  All attempts to articulate an ontology of life after Aristotle remain, Thacker argues, caught in this problematic.  

One important upshot of this problematic is that the idea of Life (beyond life) is persistently trailed by ideas of nothingness, the void.  Thacker finds negative theology particularly interesting in the history of ontologies of life since it makes explicit the contradictions which arise whenever Life is ontologized, that is, cast in specific ways (typically, as time, form or spirit).​[6]​  According to Thacker, negative theology construes Life-beyond-life as superlative life.  Moreover, Thacker explains, the notion of superlative life implies an ontology of life framed in temporal, processual terms since it is an endless and everlasting life, a ceaseless process of infinite generosity and generativity.  Drawing on the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius and John Scottus Eriugena, Thacker contends that the identification of the divine nature with superlative life in negative theology produces a division in the concept of life between God’s life on the one hand and creaturely life on the other.  While the former must be ontologically presupposed as that which accounts for the latter, in itself it is beyond all thought and experience, and can only be expressed in negative terms.​[7]​  For Thacker, the apophatic logic of negative theology is significant in ontologies of life precisely because it sustains the contradiction that is the thought of superlative life as nothing (nihil). 

Drawing on insights gleaned from Thacker’s After Life, the aim of this essay is to explore the theoretical and practical implications of the Life-living distinction as it manifests itself in the writings of Eckhart and Deleuze respectively.  This comparative study will proceed in three main steps.  First, I discuss some of Eckhart’s perplexing claims regarding the nothingness of both creation and God in light of Thacker’s remarks about superlative life and apophatic logic.  As we shall see, for Eckhart, the excessive abundance of divine life has no limit and thus is not divorced from creation but is immanent in all created things.  A key task of this essay, then, is to elucidate how Eckhart’s apophaticism does not call for the denunciation of this-worldly life.  Nevertheless, I go on to criticise Eckhart’s ontology for holding that the being of creatures is entirely loaned to them by God, such that in themselves creatures have no being – and, thus, no life – of their own.​[8]​  

In the second part of this essay, I outline key aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy of life, which sees the Life-living distinction cashed out in terms of the virtual (Life) and the actual (the living), two central concepts in Deleuze’s metaphysics.​[9]​  In this section, I show how Deleuze’s insistence on the absolute immanence of life actually renders life, in its virtual, creative sense, an absolute transcendence: that which is wholly ineffable and ethereal compared to the determinateness of finite actuality.  To observe that Deleuze’s work exhibits mystical tendencies is not new.​[10]​  However, by juxtaposing his position with that of Eckhart’s, I hope to show two things.  First, Deleuze’s strict immanentism runs into the same difficulties as Eckhart’s apophaticism, namely, the status of the finite in relation to the infinite.  Second, I argue that because absolute immanent life is, for Deleuze, nothing but a creative force of perpetual differing, material finitude is thoroughly undermined since the stability of identity and relationality is not only illusory but is inevitably opposed to life.  Indeed, while I question Eckhart’s denial of the creature’s power to be, I nevertheless shall claim that he is more successful than Deleuze in affirming material finitude.  

In the third and final section, I consider the notion of the spiritual life as it is envisaged by Eckhart and (implicitly) Deleuze.  We will see that both thinkers advocate some type of redemptive liberation from worldly images so that the self may express more fully and transparently the creative (divine) source that is ground of all the living.  Once again, I underline those elements in both Eckhart’s and Deleuze’s works which seem to me to weaken the value of creatures in themselves.  I end the paper by suggesting that William Desmond’s notion of God as ‘agapeic origin’ indicates how we might be able to articulate divine transcendence as that which reinforces and values creaturely life in itself, thus dispelling the Nietzschean charge that to uphold divine transcendence is to degrade finite, contingent life.  

Eckhart and the Concept of Life: One as Nothing 

Life is everywhere in Eckhart’s writings.  But – unlike ‘being’, ‘intellect’, or ‘oneness’ – it is a category which he tends to approach in an implicit, diffuse manner.​[11]​  That being said, there seems to be at least three main ways in which the word ‘life’ is used in his work.  The first is with reference to ‘living being’.  By this he broadly means that which has self-motion.  ‘Living being’, thus, implies a view of life in terms of biological processes by virtue of which bodily things strive to preserve their being.  A living being is, therefore, mortal: upon death it ceases to be.​[12]​

The second, and most important, use of the term ‘life’ to be found in Eckhart’s texts is that of ‘eternal life’.  The basis of this expression, as it is understood by Eckhart, lies in the New Testament, particularly the Johannine writings.  Marion L. Soards explains that the notion of eternal life serves to highlight both the temporal (everlasting) and qualitative (abundance) superiority of divine life compared to natural or biological life.​[13]​  Moreover, Soards emphasizes the Trinitarian character of divine life.  He also points out that the qualitative dimension of eternal life can refer to a transformed human existence in the here and now, rather than after biological death.  Finally, Soards notes that the opposite of eternal life is not so much natural death but sin.  

Below we will consider Eckhart’s account of the eternal life in more detail.  What remains to be noted is the third way in which Eckhart uses the word ‘life’ in his works, namely, with respect to the spiritual life of human beings.  For Eckhart, the idea of the spiritual life is crucially connected to that of eternal life: it is precisely by living in such a way that one expresses as fully as possible the eternal life of the divine that one lives a spiritual life.  As we will see, it is Eckhart’s view that the spiritual life demands our ‘becoming-nothing’,​[14]​ demands, that is, our detachment from the standpoint of creaturely life.  

The expression ‘becoming-nothing’ is one I find intriguing when trying to make sense of the theme of life in Eckhart’s works.  On the one hand, for Eckhart, the insistence on the becoming-nothing of creatures serves to safeguard the primacy of divine, eternal life.  But the corollary of this is that creaturely life must be understood as that which in itself is ultimately lifeless, is nothing.  On the other hand, the becoming-nothing of creatures coincides with the becoming-nothing of divine life, for the soul must ascend beyond even the fecundity of Trinitarian life to the nothingness of the Godhead who is God beyond God.  

Given Eckhart’s distinction between God (as Trinity) and the Godhead (the One), it appears that even eternal life in all its plenitude is ultimately eclipsed by the absolute nothingness that is the Godhead.  In accordance with Thacker’s observations regarding the concept of life within the framework of negative theology, we find that, for Eckhart, divine, eternal life can only be thought negatively as nothing.  That Eckhart’s concept of life is seemingly at odds with itself is something I neither wish to criticise nor attempt to resolve.  Rather, I seek to clarify the significance of this paradox for Eckhart’s understanding of God as well as his conception of the relationship between God and the world, transcendence and immanence.​[15]​  To do this, I first explore how Eckhart attempts to address the difficult challenge of upholding both eternal, Trinitarian life and the barrenness of the Godhead. Thereafter, I consider his account of creation as that which lives by virtue of the divine life that is its source.

According to Bernard McGinn, the term ‘ground’ (grunt in Middle High German) functions as a ‘master metaphor’ in Eckhart’s vernacular works.​[16]​  The term is multifaceted; however, at this point, I want to highlight how he uses the notion of ground to indicate ‘the pure potentiality of the hidden divine mystery’.​[17]​  For Eckhart, ground as pure, divine potentiality runs deeper than even the eternal life of the Trinity.​[18]​  Desert, wasteland, wilderness, these are the metaphors Eckhart typically uses to articulate the inmost ground of the divine.  Indeed, when Eckhart pushes his apophaticism to the extreme, even the stark image of the desert must give way to the idea of nothingness.  The path of negation traces the unbecoming of God, the movement whereby even being itself (the classic name of God) must be abandoned so that only the pure nothingness of the Godhead remains, the silent, immobile, formless ground which transcends the three Persons of the Trinity.  In Eckhart’s striking words, ‘God and Godhead are as different as heaven and earth...God becomes and unbecomes’.​[19]​ 

The ineffable Godhead has a definite priority in Eckhart’s work.  Yet this presents his listeners (and later readers) with some tricky issues to address, such as the extent to which he departs from an orthodox Trinitarian theology.  The issue I want to examine raised by Eckhart’s emphasis on the Godhead concerns the implication this has for the concept of life in his work.  Does he prioritise nothingness and death over life?  Does the commitment to divine transcendence which motivates his apophaticism eventually lead to a nihilistic negation of life, both Trinitarian and creaturely?  Let us see how he might respond to such questions.

Taken at face value, the oneness of the Godhead seems to efface even the distinction of the three Persons so that the pure divine essence is supratrinitarian in nature.  In a bold passage from sermon 8, Eckhart writes that insofar as God is one and indivisible, ‘He is neither Father, Son, nor Holy Ghost, and yet is a Something which is neither this nor that’.​[20]​  Although the 1329 papal Bull issued against Ekchart includes two articles on his notion of divine indistinctness, a number of contemporary commentators urge his present day readers to acknowledge his dialectical understanding of the One.  For Eckhart, both the indistinctness of the divine essence – which as such is not one in a numerical sense – and the distinction of the three Persons of the Trinity are equally preserved in a manner beyond our comprehension.  

Eckhart’s account of the divine is dialectical in the sense that it simultaneously upholds two ideas that on one level are ‘as different as heaven and earth’ and on another are indistinguishable: God as One and God as Three.  Importantly, as Barbara Lanzetta explains, Eckhart’s dialectic does not come to rest in a final, metaphysical end, pace Hegel.​[21]​  Instead, for Eckhart, dialectic expresses a ‘dynamic relationalism’,​[22]​ and might be better understood as a negative dialectic insofar as it refuses any sort of metaphysical closure or resolution of contradiction.  

I would like to suggest that this notion of a ‘dynamic relationalism’ offers a way to articulate something of the character of divine life, which, of course, is that which ultimately exceeds all categories of thought.  According to Eckhart, the One as simple ground (grunt), as Godhead, is motionless in itself and does not act, for it is the very possibility of all action and movement.​[23]​ However, for Eckhart, the One can also be understood ‘as a principle (principiat)’​[24]​, that is, as the font of the intense, creative surge that is the production or emanation of the three Persons.  Eckhart, intentionally it seems, confuses the One as simple and unmoving ground with the One as that principle which creatively generates Trinitarian life.  Commenting on Exodus 3: 14, ‘I am that I am’, he writes

The repetition...indicates the purity of affirmation excluding all negation from God...  It further indicates a “boiling” [bullitio] or giving birth to itself – glowing in itself, and melting and boiling in and into itself...  Therefore John 1 says, “In him was life” (Jn. 1:4).  “Life” expresses a type of “pushing out”, by which something swells up in itself and first breaks out totally in itself, each part into each part, before it puts itself forth and “boils over” [ebullitio] on the outside.​[25]​ 

In this deeply evocative passage we see Eckhart offer a number of dynamic images of life, which is figured in terms of ‘boiling’, ‘birthing’, ‘pushing out’, ‘swelling up’, and ‘breaking out’.  Importantly, Eckhart envisages life as a two-fold dynamic.  First there is the dynamic internal to the divine nature and second there is the dynamic between God and creation.  As we will see, both these dynamics have a dialectical shape.  

At the intradivine level, life describes the inner ‘boiling’ (bullitio) of the One as its inexhaustible potentiality swells up within itself and then, in a ‘boiling without any “boiling over”’,​[26]​ inwardly gives birth to itself as the Trinitarian God.  The three Persons of the Trinity thus emanate from the silent, empty desert of the One in a movement from nothingness to Trinitarian life.  Crucially, for Eckhart, the three Persons are not produced outside the oneness of the Godhead but remain within it in a ‘union of indistinction’.​[27]​  The nothingness of the Godhead is at once the fullness of eternal, Trinitarian life.  Taking our cue from McGinn, we might say that the divine ground, the One, is not so much a thing but an activity: a ceaseless living Life that brings being and life to all things.​[28]​

While Eckhart is careful to distinguish between bullitio (the production of the three Persons) and ebullitio (the creation of the world), he nevertheless insists on their necessary interrelation.  God’s inward boiling is ‘the cause and exemplar’ of creation.​[29]​  Otherwise put, God is the fountainhead that overflows into all things, flows forth with being, with life and with light.​[30]​ 

Following Thacker, the divine boiling and boiling over (bullitio and ebullitio) may be understood in terms of ‘superlative Life’, namely, Life as pure generosity, an endless flowing forth, the Life which is the ground of all living creatures.  Because superlative Life is God, apophaticism dictates that it must be expressed negatively, and paradoxically, as nothing: God as superlative Life is not a living thing since God is the principle by which anything lives at all.  But if superlative Life is nothing does this not paradoxically spell the death of God?  Is God the Life which does not live?  To fully address such questions would require probing the subtleties of Eckhart’s conception of nothing and negation, which I do not have the space to do in this essay.  However, as I read him, when Eckhart refers to the nothingness of God he understands this in both a negative and a positive sense.​[31]​  

God is nothing in a negative sense insofar as God is considered in relation to the being and life of the created order.  For Eckhart, whenever notions such as being and life are affirmed of creatures, they must be denied of God, who transcends the created order and cannot be delimited by its categories.  However, there is a twist to God’s nothingness, for it can also be viewed positively as the ‘negation of the negation’.  Here, the initial negation by which God is not-being, not-life, is in turn negated, thus accomplishing the ‘purest form of affirmation’,​[32]​ whereby God is being itself and life itself.  Yet, insofar as being and life is affirmed of God, these categories must be denied of creatures in themselves.  According to Eckhart, ‘God negates the negation: He is one and negates all else, for outside of God nothing is’.​[33]​  Creatures only have being insofar as they share in God’s being.  Hence, Eckhart’s repeated claim that in themselves creatures are nothing.  

It is God as the negation of the negation which establishes the inversion of divine transcendence into divine immanence: the being of God is no less than the innermost ground of all things, that secret depth by which all things are sustained in their existence.  Indeed, for Eckhart, ‘every creature is full of God’.​[34]​  One way in which we might think of God’s nothingness, as adumbrated by Eckhart, as an immanent transcendence.  God is ineffable not because He is radically exterior to all things but because He is so deeply interior, dwelling in all things as their hidden, inscrutable source.

Eckhart’s depiction of God’s nothingness raises important questions as to how he envisages the relation between God and creation.  Does he save the creature from nothingness by asserting, in some sort of pantheistic gesture, that God simply is the totality of all things? Conversely, does he save God from nothingness by denying the reality of created things (the cosmos) in a nihilistic turn that would open his metaphysical position to the charge of acosmism?  Because I am keen to rebut Nietzsche’s and Deleuze’s claim that the avowal of divine transcendence necessarily leads to the effacement of worldly life, I wish to investigate the extent to which Eckhart’s metaphysics might be deemed acosmistic.  Hegel would criticise Spinoza’s system for having ‘too much God’,​[35]​ such that all differentiation disappears into ‘a night in which all cows are black’.​[36]​  Does Eckhart’s system exhibit this same problem?  Indeed, is ‘too much God’ even a problem?

According to Eckhart: ‘God alone, insofar as he is Final End and First Mover, lives and is life’.​[37]​   Where life is conceived as self-motion, only God is truly alive.  From this we must conclude that, in themselves, creatures are lifeless.  For Eckhart, this does not mean that creaturely life is illusory but rather that creatures cannot exist or live apart from God.  Eckhart puts this plainly, ‘If God were not in all things, nature would cease operation and not strive for anything’.​[38]​  Such a comment would seem to support a pantheist reading of Eckhart.  But this would not be quite right, for it is less that Eckhart dissolves God into things and more that he dissolves things into God.  Indeed, he claims, ‘creatures are one in the one, and are God in God: in themselves they are nothing’.​[39]​  But if there is such continuity between creatures and God, insofar as creatures are viewed not in themselves but in relation to the source of their being and life (God), then how might a distinction be made between God and creation?  That is to say, how does Eckhart avoid producing an apophatic ontology whereby God’s being consumes all distinctions?  

Once again, Eckhart appeals to a dialectical account of created being in order to maintain both the distinctness of creatures and their oneness (indistinctness) in God.  This can be seen in the distinction Eckhart makes between what he calls ‘virtual being’ (esse virtual) and ‘formal being’ (esse formale).​[40]​  The former refers to the being of things as they exist in God’s eternal being.  To say that things exist virtually in God is to say that they are ideas in the mind of God, and thus remain within the First Cause.  Formal being, by contrast, refers to the existence of things as they are in time and space.  To be a creature is to exist as a determinate being, to exist as this or that (ens hoc aut hoc).  Insofar as we regard the virtual being of creatures we must acknowledge the univocity of being; it is one and the same (divine) power of existing which dwells in stone or wood, insect or soul.  As Eckhart tells us, ‘God is equally in all things and all places’.​[41]​  Insofar as we regard the formal being of creatures we are confronted with equivocal being, the multiplicity of things.  It is only by asserting the dialectical relation between virtual being and formal being of creatures that Eckhart can uphold the polarities that are the creature’s coincidence with the One and the creature’s individuatedness.  Importantly, it is the dialectical formulation of the relationship between God and creatures which makes possible the presence of divine transcendence in worldly immanence, and opens worldly immanence onto the plenitude that is divine being, eternal life.

If by acosmism we mean the denial of the created world in order to assert the reality of God alone, then it would be unfair to ascribe this position to Eckhart.  While Eckhart would always insists on the nothingness of creatures in themselves, he does not maintain that the created order is illusory precisely because each created being exists as a manifestation of God.  Significantly, Eckhart does not claim that creatures express God’s essence as such but rather His pure and infinite creative power, which Eckhart articulates in terms of nothingness, since God, as the source of all things, is no-thing in particular.  

These points enable us to begin to make sense of the following lines from Eckhart’s famous sermon 52, on spiritual poverty: ‘For before there were creatures, God was not ‘God’: he was That which He was.  But when creatures came into existence and received their created being, then God was not ‘God’ in Himself – He was ‘God’ in creatures’.​[42]​  Bluntly put, ‘God’ manifested in creatures is nothing (for He is not God in Himself) but this nothing is a pregnant nothingness, not an empty void.  While Edward Howells is right to say that, for Eckhart, ‘to be a creature is to live under a radical negativity’,​[43]​ we must appreciate that this negativity does not imply the negation of creaturely life but rather the creature’s porosity to eternal life, that divine, creative potential in and through which all creatures live.

And yet, despite these clarifications, I nevertheless remain uneasy with Eckhart’s account of creaturely life because he does not go far enough in granting creatures a being (and so life) of their own.​[44]​  Although Eckhart refers to the formal being of creatures, we must appreciate that insofar as formal being is taken in itself it is always a pure nothing in the negative sense of non-being, thoroughly devoid of all potential (unlike divine nothingness).  Indeed, for Eckhart, the idea of the creature in itself is always an abstraction because there can be no such thing.   To be sure, as I noted above, Eckhart is not saying that the created order in its tangible materiality is unreal.  For Eckhart the created order does not simply refer to the material universe comprising living things, but, more precisely, to that which receives its existence from something other than itself, namely, God (who, as being in itself, is entirely self-subsistent).  Yet, and here is my grievance, the existence the creature receives is never anything other than God’s own power of existence; all that really ‘belongs’ to the creature is nothingness.  By not conceding a degree of autonomy to created beings such that they possess, even in the most fragile sense, an existence of their own, Eckhart eliminates what we might call the ‘interval of difference’ between divine life and creaturely life.  The former thus becomes a life that differs with itself alone.

This is problematic, I believe, because it renders God something like an ‘erotic absolute’, a term I borrow from William Desmond who uses it to describe the Hegelian absolute.​[45]​  According to Desmond, the erotic absolute is that which determines itself through the other, where the other turns out to be no more (and, indeed, no less) than the self-othering of the absolute as it realises its own determinateness.  It is my contention that in Eckhart’s metaphysical system there is ‘too much God’.  This is a problem, I believe, because it denies creatures a measure of autonomy by which God’s love for creation is not at bottom self-love (such that God may be deemed an erotic absolute), but directed towards the created order as a relative otherness​[46]​ that is capable of reciprocating (to a greater or lesser extent) God’s love.  

Deleuze and the Concept of Life: All as Nothing

In his last published paper, Deleuze writes,

We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else.  It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life.  A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, complete bliss.​[47]​ 

For Deleuze, immanence and life necessarily imply each other.  Crucially, he insists that if immanence is to be pure immanence then it must be immanent to nothing but itself alone, it must not be immanent to some other thing, such as God or the Subject.  When no longer suspended by transcendence, immanence thus becomes ‘a life’, which Deleuze characterizes in a number of ways including ‘transcendental field’, ‘the virtual’, ‘the plane of consistency’, and ‘the Body without Organs’.  Notably, Deleuze refers to pure immanence as ‘a life’ rather than ‘the life’.  The use of the indefinite article is significant because it enables Deleuze to emphasise life as pure, creative potentiality or power, and, thus, as necessarily indeterminate because it is the (always immanent) basis for any determination whatsoever.  A life precedes subject and object, it precedes the organic, for it is a restless flow of vital intensities in and through which worlds are made.  

While Deleuze sometimes speaks of life as a transcendental condition, it must be stressed that he does not mean a transcendent condition: life – the plane of immanence – is not divorced from the world of finite things; rather it is a creative force harboured in all things.  This creative force exceeds whatever is and it is that which enables the becoming-other of all things.  Interestingly though, because pure immanence is necessarily indefinite it defies all representation.  Pure immanence as such escapes all categorization and thus transcends all particular forms of life.  As Deleuze says, pure immanence is ‘that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought...  It is the most intimate within thought and yet the absolute outside – an outside more distant than any external world because it is an inside deeper than any internal world’.​[48]​  Immanence purified of all relations to transcendence paradoxically becomes indistinguishable from transcendence.  But this need not be a problem for Deleuze because pure immanence, or life, effectively confounds the distinction between immanence and transcendence such that we may view life as an immanent transcendence.  

Deleuze’s vision of life in terms of pure immanence finds itself in proximity with Eckhart’s account of God in terms of nothingness, discussed above.  Although Deleuze does not identify life with God, it is still possible to say, with Philip Goodchild, that ‘he [Deleuze] makes divinity into a power of affirmation and creativity immanent to life itself’.​[49]​  Deleuze’s pure immanence as life and Eckhart’s transcendent God as eternal life reach a point of indistinction, insofar as both refuse the traditional formulation of transcendence and immanence in terms of a dualistic opposition.  Moreover, Deleuze’s account of pure difference and Eckhart’s account of the One also share unexpected similarities as we will see in the following discussion.

Perhaps the central question inspiring Deleuze’s philosophical enterprise is that of how to think pure difference, that is, difference in itself.  In Difference and Repetition, he charges much of the history of western philosophy with adhering to a ‘dogmatic image of thought’,​[50]​ central to which is representational thinking.  Here, thought approaches the world as that which presents the mind with stable, unified object which thought then re-presents (presents again) to the subject.  The problem with this model of thinking, Deleuze argues, is that a thing simply comes to exemplify a particular instance of a universal category.  For Deleuze, if difference is to be thought in itself it must not be construed in relation to sameness but in relation to difference in its immediacy, a ceaseless process of differing out of which identities are produced.  Beyond the bounds of representation, it is identity which turns on difference.  In Deleuze’s words, ‘difference is behind everything, but behind difference there is nothing’.​[51]​  Difference in itself is not a thing (identity) but a process; it is life, a dynamic, creative stream of differentiating difference.  For Deleuze, life is not characterised by oneness and being but multiplicity and becoming.

It is because Deleuze contends that transcendence prioritises identity over difference that he will insist on immanence as that which can release pure difference from the life-denying grip of identity.  In order to ensure that transcendence (which is, Deleuze tells us, only ever an illusion engendered by the inability to think immanence) is thoroughly banished from the plane of immanence, Deleuze insists on the univocity of being.  This means ‘being is said in a single and same sense of everything which it is said’.​[52]​  In other words, everything is fully and equally real; there are no higher or lower forms of being (contra Thomistic analogia entis).  For Deleuze, this means that, in a certain manner, ‘the tick [as in an arachnid] is God; there is no difference of category, there is no difference of substance, there is no difference of form. It becomes a mad [dèmente] thought’.​[53]​  To think the univocity of being is maddening precisely because it is the attempt to think life without form, essence, or category.  But Deleuze finds this promissory inasmuch as univocity enables thought to draw upon its own powers of becoming and differentiating, such that thought may be characterised by its creativity rather than by its representational capacity.

It might seem as though a univocal ontology flattens all difference into sameness.  While Deleuze appeals to Duns Scotus for the concept of univocity, he turns to Spinoza’s Ethics in order to show how univocal being can become expressive of pure difference.  With Spinoza, there is only one substance – God or Nature – which expresses itself in infinite ways in the attributes and the modes.  Thus, whatever is, is the one substance expressing itself.  Deleuze radicalises Spinoza’s monistic metaphysics by rendering substance a living, creative force rather than an immutable thing.  It is Deleuze’s view that once we grasp univocal being as expressive we can then appreciate that being is differentiation.  To say that being is univocal, therefore, is to say that whatever is, is a process of creative differing, is life.

Moreover, a metaphysics of pure difference – one secured by the principles of univocity and expression – demands the transformation of traditional dualistic formulations of the one and the many.  Crucially, it is not that Deleuze wishes to privilege difference over unity.  This is because he views difference (pure immanence) as fundamentally double-sided, in the sense that there are both specific, actual differences as well as a virtual power of differing at the heart of every determinate difference.  Deleuze’s important distinction between the virtual and the actual is not too dissimilar from Eckhart’s own distinction between the creature’s virtual being and formal being highlighted earlier.  The virtual, Deleuze explains, is life in its intensive register, which we might think of as life in a continuous dynamic of varying intensities.  Although distinct, these varying intensities constitute an indivisible continuum, just as differing sounds run into each other as one continuous flow when we hear a piece of music.  Deleuze is keen to stress the virtual is not the possible (i.e., that which may be) because the virtual is fully real, even if it is not actual.  The actual, for Deleuze, is life in its extensive register and refers to all determinate things in space and time.  Actual objects ‘incarnate’, as it were, the creative dynamic and intensities of the virtual.  Crucially, the actual does not add existence to the virtual but expresses it in unanticipatable ways.  Furthermore, the process of actualization effectively slows down and ‘cuts up’ the continuous flow of intensive, virtual life (which is becoming at infinite speed) and, thus, expresses life in extensive (divisible), material, relatively stable forms.  

Returning now to the interplay of the one and the many, for Deleuze, the one as virtual, creative power is immanent in its countless expressions.  As Deleuze puts it, ‘Monism and pluralism: it’s the same thing...there are only multiplicities’.​[54]​  Or, more lyrically, ‘A single and same voice for the whole thousand voiced multiple, a single and same Ocean for all the drops, a single clamour of Being for all beings’.​[55]​  All creations express one and the same activity of creating – or life – which is nowhere but in its multiple creations, yet always exceeds any single creation.  

Deleuze’s idea of multiplicity, which obviates a dualistic formulation of the one and the many, echoes in some ways with Eckhart’s dialectical understanding of the One.  However, we must be mindful of delicate yet significant nuances in the metaphysical accounts proposed by these two thinkers.  Deleuze’s careful elaboration of pure immanence proceeds by secreting the one into the many.  With pure difference presented as multiplicity, Deleuze liquefies the relation between the one and the many to the point where we could say pure immanence just is pure relationality.  Thus, each individual creation (or rather creating) expresses, albeit in a singular way, the entirety of immanent life, rather akin to a Leibnizian monad.  As sheer relationality, univocal immanence actually flips over to its inverse: equivocity.  Indeed, Deleuze writes, ‘Univocity signifies that being itself is univocal, while that of which it is said is equivocal’.​[56]​ 

But this swing between the univocal and the equivocal exposes problems in Deleuze’s account of life as pure immanence.  On the one hand, immanence as equivocity is characterised by a flux of indifferent differences (singularities), wherein there can be no shared term between life as a virtual, creative power and the living as the actualisations of that power.  Life thus becomes pure chaos, completely unthinkable, and, in the end, unliveable, for no stable, determinable forms can endure.  On the other hand, immanence as univocity is characterised by the total dispersal of (virtual) life in finite actuality, such that Deleuze will have a tough time explaining how the promise of the actual’s creative transformation (by the virtual’s productive power) can ever be made good, at least not without re-introducing transcendence as some sort of reserve vital power beyond all actuality.  The problem for Deleuze is that when immanence becomes immanent to itself alone, the virtual is then exhausted by its own actualisations (finite determinations), thus persisting only as ‘an abstract, ghostly force that never appears, is never presented or given’.​[57]​  

Now according to Deleuze, ‘Immanence is opposed to any eminence of the cause, any negative theology, any method of analogy, any hierarchical conception of the world.  With immanence all is affirmation’.​[58]​  Affirmation is important to Deleuze because it safeguards difference in itself, that is, difference as entirely positive and originary, rather than derived at through a process of negation.  However, in my discussion of the two-fold character of pure immanence, which is at once univocal and equivocal, I have begun to show how Deleuze’s immanentism finds itself quietly but inescapably bound up with the nihil.  As Thacker contends, it is precisely because the Deleuzian One is immanently equal to the All that it is also Nothing.​[59]​  To elucidate: the Deleuzian One cuts across all things insofar as it is a virtual power of creating ‘located’ only in the thick of actual things.  Yet as that virtual power by which actuality can be revivified by the emergence of the new, the One is a principle of immanence other than the All in which it is immanent.  But immanence is all there is: the One is thus nothing.  

However, and here we see the proximity with Eckhart, Deleuze’s One as Nothing is not non-being but rather it is a generative nothing; it is the locus of all becomings.  Nevertheless, unlike Eckhart, Deleuze’s One is a dark divinity in the sense that it produces, not a hierarchically ordered cosmos which has its source in the supreme eminence of divine life (Eckhart), but a chaos of pure difference differing, endless indeterminate becomings at infinite speed.  The One, for Deleuze, is the refusal of all identity, and as such it may be viewed as ‘a diabolical principle’, ‘the Anti-Christ’, an unholy nexus ‘where an exuberant, stormy nature reigns, full of raping, shameful debauchery and travesty’.​[60]​  Thacker describes Deleuze’s immanentist account of life in terms of a ‘heretical’ or ‘dark pantheism’.​[61]​  In contrast to a ‘theological pantheism’ (really a panentheism), whereby an anthropomorphic God serves as the sovereign Creator and Source of all things, and to a modern ‘hippie pantheism’, whereby nature is basically benevolent and serves as home for humanity, dark pantheism ‘thinks both life and negation in the same thought’ and so ‘is poised against the presumptions of life-as-generosity, as gift, as givenness’.​[62]​  In other words, whereas negative theology emphasizes the encompassing of all things by that divine, superlative Life (the One as All) which exceeds nature even as it is immanent in nature, dark pantheism emphasizes the immanence of all things and nothingness (the All as nihil).​[63]​

Although Eckhart uses images of ‘darkness’ to convey the wholly mysterious and hidden divine essence (the Godhead), he often employs images of light with regard to both God’s essence and the eternal ground of the soul.  For Eckhart we are to think God paradoxically as a ‘dark light’ – dark because no image can adequately represent God, light because God’s nothingness is that which envelopes all distinctions in ‘the life of unity’.​[64]​  Deleuze’s ‘chaosmos’​[65]​ figures difference as that which relates back only to more difference, and so relates back to nothing determinate at all.  When Deleuze writes, ‘it is only with itself that life differs’​[66]​ he articulates a dark version of Desmond’s erotic absolute.   With Eckhart, by contrast, difference is viewed within the context of ‘a transcendentalist cosmology’,​[67]​ which dialectically relates difference to an Absolute Unity (albeit a paradoxical unity which encompasses the distinctions of Trinitarian life), and so establishes a certain cosmic orderliness.  

Notably, Deleuze appeals to what he calls the ‘dark precursor’, an opaque figure which (grossly oversimplifying) is something like the original force of pure difference and is ‘the first agent of communication between series of differences’.​[68]​  It is the dark precursor which secures the ‘articulation’ of absolute immanence such that it can express and re-express itself in relatively determinate, though contingent, ways.  Without its articulation, absolute immanence would remain at the level of sheer chaos.  And yet to the extent that the dark precursor affirms the immanent whole as an unsystematic consistency (that is, more than mere chaos but less than a teleologically ordered universe), it functions suspiciously like a transcendent origin, for it must stand outside immanence in order to affirm it.  When Deleuze tell us that ‘immanence is the very vertigo of philosophy’,​[69]​ I believe he points to the difficulty of conceiving the immanent affirmation of absolute immanence without secretly re-introducing transcendence.​[70]​

Visions of the Spiritual Life: Deleuze and Eckhart

James Williams suggests two basic maxims which can be derived from Deleuze’s philosophy.  These are (i) ‘forget everything’ and (ii) ‘connect with everything’.​[71]​  For Deleuze, we are to ‘leave all actual things behind’ in order to allow ‘our thought and bodies to turn to intensities, to difference itself’.​[72]​  Deleuze’s notion of ‘becoming-imperceptible’​[73]​ is precisely the attempt to adhere to these maxims.  As we might expect, ‘becoming’ is a central motif in Deleuze’s work.  At their subterranean core, finite actualities – or, what Deleuze labels, molar identities – always remain continuous with the creative dynamic of the virtual.  It is precisely this connection to the virtual that affords molar identities a molecular dimension by means of which they can undergo various transformations, right up to the point of creating ‘lines of flight’​[74]​ which break with preceding identities and inaugurate the event of the new.  Becoming, Deleuze insists, is not the becoming of one thing into another but the process of creating.  In becoming-imperceptible we (human beings) are asked to transcend the illusory fixity of molar identities (forget everything) and to become increasingly receptive to the potentialities of virtual life (connect with everything), thereby becoming expressive of pure difference itself, and so enabling new modes of living, both bodily and mentally.

When one reaches the stage of becoming-imperceptible, the distinction between the infinite and the finite, the absolute and the relative become indistinct.  One thus enters, Deleuze tells us, ‘the haecceity and impersonality of the creator.  One is then like grass...one has suppressed in oneself everything that prevents us from slipping between things and growing in the midst of things’.​[75]​  Another way in which Deleuze describes the individual who penetrates into the innermost depth of life is ‘spiritual automaton’, a Spinozist term, and which denotes a frictionless continuity with the creative forces of life as a whole.  

Deleuze’s becoming-imperceptible looks very much like an individual’s mystical union with the divine, albeit a thoroughly immanent divinity.  Peter Hallward protests that the mystical tenor of Deleuze’s work is unfortunate because it encourages disengagement from embodied life and its web of concrete relations.​[76]​  I broadly agree with Hallward’s conclusions.  However, I think he tends to underplay Deleuze’s insistence that the virtual is never without the actual: for Deleuze, becoming-imperceptible implicates both dimensions of immanent life.  That said, my worry is that Deleuze’s immanentism unwittingly renders finite actuality a realm characterised by chronic passivity and inertia.  

Finitude, on Deleuze’s account, is that which traps and alienates life in its virtual and intensive register.  ‘Every species is an arrest of movement...living being [virtual life] turns on itself and closes itself’.​[77]​  Deleuze cannot mean to suggest that the actual entirely closes off from the virtual since this would sever the actual’s tie to its creative source.  However, insofar as the actual represents, for Deleuze, life at it weakest intensity, that which is nothing in itself, it strikes me that determinate forms of life exist in a perpetual state of suspense.  With Deleuze, living actualities are simply conduits for the erratic ebb and flow of a virtual life that in itself can never be given.  For Deleuze, ‘what is [really] real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes’.​[78]​  It seems to me that the character of a spiritual life guided by the axioms of Deleuze’s immanentism would be one of quiet surrender to the forces of becoming that occur behind the scenes of actuality – a tragic actuality that can only ever betray the intensities of becoming.
 
Eckhart teaches that the single task of the spiritual life is the practice of detachment (abegescheidenheit).  The aim of detachment is the self’s ‘breaking through’ (durchbruch) to the ground of the soul which is at one with the divine ground in a union of indistinction.  The exercise of detachment is the ‘becoming-nothing’ of the self, a process which demands cutting all attachments to creaturely life.  As we have seen, for Eckhart, it is only God who truly lives and is the ground of all that is living.  Thus, with respect to the soul, he says, ‘there is nothing for it but to peel off and shed all that belongs to the soul: her life, her powers, her nature – all must go, and she must stand in the pure light where she is one single image with God: there she will find God’.​[79]​     

Eckhart always reminds us that ‘the merely temporal life in itself is a negation of real being, because it depends on itself and not on the deepest foundation of life’.​[80]​  Creatures are nothing in relation to God.  Eckhart does not shirk from the implications of this with respect to the spiritual life: ‘we should act as if we were dead, being untouched by neither joy nor sorrow’.​[81]​  Remarks like this provide grist to the mill of those such as Nietzsche and Deleuze who argue that the avowal of divine transcendence is at once the disavowal of this-worldly life.  

But I hope to have shown that, for Deleuze, immanent life in itself is a flow of creative energies that finite actuality only ever impedes and restricts.  To remain attached to the world in its actuality is to refuse the virtual dynamics of life.  As Kristien Justaert points out,​[82]​ Deleuze’s ‘becoming-imperceptible’ and Eckhart’s ‘becoming-nothing’ share the same impulse to the extent that they both seek to renounce representational thinking.  However, while Justaert finds Deleuze’s immanentism an exciting resource for a theology and spirituality of life, I am less sanguine about this prospect.  By my lights, Deleuze’s metaphysics risks opposing virtual life to actuality, even though the former cannot be without the latter.  

Is it the case that Eckhart’s doctrine of detachment results in the opposition of God’s eternal life to temporal creation?  Eckhart is keen to show that the practice of detachment is not supposed to end in quietude, in a pious disengagement from everyday life.  Rather it is to live in the world differently, for one lives wholly awakened to one’s source in the divine ground.  He reminds us: ‘What is life? God’s being is my life.  If my life is God’s being, then God’s essence must be my essence, and God’s self-identity my self-identity, neither more nor less’.​[83]​  Detachment, for Eckhart, makes worldly immanence receptive to its productive ground in God’s essence, and in doing so creates space for God’s eternal life to become a living transcendence, a transformative presence in the world.  

Another way in which Eckhart articulates the idea of living from the divine ground is in terms of ‘Living without a why’.​[84]​  To live for some particular purpose is to remain caught up with creaturely interests and perspectives, whereas to live without a why is precisely to surrender such attachments.  When we live at one with God we espy, as Charlotte Radler puts it, ‘the real transparent unity that constitutes the core of our existence’​[85]​ – an eternal life that as the one in all is pure love of the world, of all beings.  ‘The aim of man’, Eckhart says, ‘is not outward holiness by works, but life in God, yet this last expresses itself in works of love’.​[86]​  

Famously, in his sermon on Martha and Mary, the sisters in Luke’s gospel, Eckhart refuses to privilege contemplative life (vita contemplativa) over active life (vita activa).  While Mary, according to Eckhart, still carried a residual attachment ‘for her soul’s satisfaction’,​[87]​ Martha, on the other hand, is so thoroughly rooted in her (eternal) ground that temporal works do not hinder her union with God.  Eckhart does not wish to elevate the active life over the contemplative life but rather he aims for a spirituality where the two are wholly integrated in a ‘living union’.​[88]​

Eckhart’s notion of ‘living without a why’ shares some common traits with Deleuze’s notion of the ‘spiritual automaton’.  Both are attempts to convey a mode of living at one with the absolute and so at the intersection between the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal.  Moreover, for both Eckhart and Deleuze, the spiritual life is not meant to deliver the individual out of the world but rather aims at intensifying one’s life in the world insofar as one expresses without obstruction that which is the generative ground of all things.  However, I have sought to show that Deleuze’s metaphysics of pure immanence ends up reducing finite actuality to a state of passive dependency that can only ever betray the ‘movement of the infinite’​[89]​ (i.e., virtual life).  Interestingly, Deleuze once commented that ‘eating bored him’,​[90]​ and while we would not want such a remark to carry the burden of critical work, it is nevertheless revealing of a certain disdain towards the domestic (and symbolically feminine) aspects of everyday living.  We have just seen how Eckhart’s teaching on detachment explicitly cautions against the desire to escape everyday life in order to repose in the bliss of eternal life.  Instead, Eckhartian spirituality aims to reveal the divine ground in the most quotidian human activity.  

I wish to claim that it is Eckhart’s apophatic ontology that enables his model of spirituality to marry temporal living and eternal life in a way that avoids the Deleuzian stress on the ceaseless undermining of finite actuality for the sake of the new.  Rather than disorganising finitude, Eckhart, I maintain, wishes to consolidate it by disclosing its basis, not in eternal chaotic differentiation (pace Deleuze), but in an Absolute Unity.  While Deleuze might complain that the transcendent One simply serves to negate difference, with Eckhart, the One is configured as ‘the negation of the negation’ and as such is ‘the purest form of affirmation’.  For Eckhart, the One is that which embraces – rather than negates – difference in a union of indistinction which we could also call love.

It is because Eckhart’s cosmology affirms the integrity and value of the created order, at least insofar as it is transparent to its divine source, that I find his position rather more promising for a theology and spirituality of this-worldly life than Deleuze’s immanentism.  That said, as I read him, I think Eckhart’s unwillingness to acknowledge the relative independence of creatures from the creator counteracts those aspects of his apophaticism which emphasize the dignity of creation.  

According to Eckhart, the person who has ‘abandoned all things on the lower plane where they are mortal, will recover them in God, where they are reality.  Whatever is dead here is alive there, and all that is dense matter here is spirit there in God’.​[91]​  This is meant to demonstrate how, from the standpoint of eternal life, all creation has its being, and therefore life, in God.  To view the world sub specie aeternitatis is to see it transfigured from nothing in itself to the revelation of the divine in worldly immanence.  But it is the idea that in themselves creatures are nothing, are indeed dead, that troubles me.  This is for two main, interrelated reasons.  The first is that, as I argued earlier, Eckhart ends up with ‘too much God’ in his ontological picture, which implicitly produces a model of God as an ‘erotic absolute’ (that which differs with itself alone).  Where there is too much God the interval of difference between God and creatures disappears and the creature’s love for God turns out to be God’s auto-affection.  

In contrast to God construed as an erotic absolute, Desmond proposes that we view God as an ‘agapeic origin’.​[92]​  By this he means an absolute which ‘releases the other as other for the sake of its otherness as other, and not for mediated purposes of its return to the origin’.​[93]​  God as agapeic origin, I maintain, enables us to affirm divine transcendence and eternal life without dispossessing creatures of a life of their own as creatures.  On this account, the spiritual life would be the creature’s becoming towards God through love, with the aim of both God and creature attaining ‘a union that sustains otherness in togetherness and is not a self-mediating unity but an intermediating metaxu [between]’.​[94]​  To grant creatures their (relative) otherness from God need not challenge the theistic view regarding the dependency of creatures on God, who is their creator and sustainer.  Commenting on divine omnipotence, Kierkegaard highlights how, paradoxically, it is by virtue of the creature’s dependence on God that the creature gains its independence:

Creation out of nothing is once again the Omnipotent One's expression for being able to make [a being] independent. He to whom I owe absolutely everything, although he still absolutely controls everything, has in fact made me independent. If in creating man God himself lost a little of his power, then precisely what he could not do would be to make a human being independent.​[95]​






In this essay I hope to have shown how Eckhart’s apophaticism and Deleuze’s immanentism, which emphasise transcendence and immanence respectively, develop conceptions of life that share instructive affinities as well as differences.  In particular we have seen the way in which the distinction between life qua generative principle and life qua the living reveals the permeability of the borders marking immanence and transcendence.  Certainly this must give pause to those who would critique along Nietzschean lines that to uphold divine transcendence is necessarily to denigrate immanent life.  We have also seen how, for both thinkers, life is paradoxically implicated in nothingness.  Yet this is not the nothingness of total nonexistence but a fecund nothingness that affords the creative transformation of all things.
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